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I.

INTRODUCTION

It happens all the time, without a second thought. People on the
golf course, at the weekly card game, or at a backyard barbecue, pass
on hot stock tips to friends and relatives. If asked about the possibility
of violating insider trading laws, the following responses would be
typical: "It could never happen to me," and "it's only a problem for
large, powerful investors." These responses, while typical, are wrong.
Just ask Carl Reiter.
One day on the golf course, one of Reiter's oldest friends advised
him to buy stock in Revco Drug Stores; the friend knew "the guy
doing the deal."' Reiter, a real estate developer, invested a few
thousand dollars in the stock, made a profit of $2,625 in two months,
and thought the investment was over. It was not. Two years later,
one of Reiter's golfing partners got a phone call from a person claiming
to be an investigator for the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). The friend's response was "yeah, right, and I'm Ivan Boesky."
The person was an investigator, and Reiter and the other golfers who
acted on the stock tip were charged with violating insider trading
laws.2 Reiter eventually disgorged his profits resulting from the tip
and paid a fine of the same amount.' Reiter was shocked that the
powerful SEC was concerned about his small investment and that
insider trading laws applied to such conduct. The actions of the SEC
in this case, however, are not unusual. The scope and application of
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2. Id.
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insider trading have expanded the concept to a point that it is no
longer limited to actual insiders and can affect any person who trades
in securities?
"Insider trading" is neither defined nor expressly prohibited by
federal securities laws. 6 Rather, the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 (Act) broadly proscribes "deceptive" practices in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities.7 Section 10(b) of the Act gives the
SEC authority to promulgate rules and regulations to achieve those
aims." Pursuant to this authority, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5, which
prohibits fraudulent and deceptive practices in the trading of securities.' These two legislative and administrative enactments are the
vehicles through which insider trading is prohibited and enforced. 10
Because the prohibition against deceptive practices is broad, and
because insider trading has not been specifically defined by Congress,
the SEC and the judiciary have defined insider trading." Unfortunately, this process has led to conflicting views of insider trading and
to decisions based primarily on the facts of each case, rather than upon
a bright line rule. 2 Moreover, the courts and the SEC do not always

5. See Barbara B. Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 373 (1988).
6. Audrey Strauss & Lisa Fishbone, Insider TradingAfter Chestman, 793 PLI/CoRP. 365,
*2 (1992), available in WESTLAW, Pli-Corp Library (pinpoint page numbers refer to
WESTLAW pagination).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); see also Strauss & Fishbone, supranote 6, at *1. Section 10(b)
prohibits the use in "connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe ..
" 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); see Strauss & Fishbone, supra note 6, at *1.
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). This Section states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.
10. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987);
Strauss & Fishbone, supra note 6, at *1.
11. Strauss & Fishbone, supra note 6, at *1.
12. See Thomas L. Hazen, United States v. Chestman - Trading Securities on the Basis of
Nonpublic Information in Advance of a Tender Offer, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 595, 597 (1991); Steven
R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic, and Ethical
Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 223 (1990).
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agree as to how wide the insider trading net should be cast. 3 Three
conclusions are certain. First, the vast majority of law in this area is
created and advanced by courts within the Second Circuit. 4 Second,
the SEC and the Second Circuit courts generally attempt to interpret
insider trading law as broadly as possible, leaving it to higher courts to
scale back the law if interpreted too broadly."5 Third, insider trading
can be divided into the following two categories: classic insider trading
and the misappropriation theory of insider trading. 6 These two
categories extend the prohibitions of Section 10(b) to two different
groups of individuals.
Classic insider trading is premised on the duty that a corporate
employee owes to shareholders of the corporation: to place the
shareholders' interests ahead of the employee's personal interests.1 7
The misappropriation theory, however, is premised upon the presence
of any fiduciary or fiduciary-type relationship between two people or
entities. Under the misappropriation theory, a party with no ties to a
corporation or any of its employees may still violate insider trading
laws by trading in the corporation's securities.'
Section 10(b) was first used to regulate insider trading in the early
1960's. The type of conduct regulated was closely tied to the express
provisions of Rule 10b-5 that prohibit fraudulent and deceptive
practices. 9 However, in 1978 the Second Circuit used a much
broader interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to combat
insider trading in Chiarellav. United States2 0 Although the Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit's broad interpretation in Chiarella,2' three years later the Court accepted an almost equally broad
interpretation in Dirks v. SEC.22 These two cases represent the core
of classic insider trading regulation.

13. Salbu, supra note 12, at 232; see, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir.
1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
14. The Second Circuit encompasses the nation's largest financial market, New York, within
its boundaries.
15. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (holding by Supreme Court that the Second Circuit had
adopted an insider trading rule that strayed too far from the tenets of Rule 10b-5); Lisa J. Finnell,
Comment, United States v. Carpenter: Second Circuit Overextends the MisappropriationTheory
of Criminal Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 605, 606 (1987).
16. See Strauss & Fishbone, supra note 6, at *1-2.
17. See infra Section II.
18. See infra Section III.
19. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
20. 588 F.2d 1358 (1978).
21. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
22. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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While the Supreme Court's reversal of Chiarellareduced the scope
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Chief Justice Burger's dissenting
opinion in the case represents the germination of the misappropriation
23 the Second Circuit relied on
theory. In United States v. Carpenter,
Chief Justice Burger's discussion of misappropriation theory to
advocate a very broad and wide reaching interpretation of Section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob- 5-one that affects any person who makes a trade in any
securities market.24 This interpretation brings people who have no
association with a corporate insider within the sphere of liability for
insider trading and epitomizes the misappropriation theory of insider
trading.2" Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly affirmed
the misappropriation theory,26 the Court has expanded the scope of
insider trading to such an extent that the activities being restrained are
not those that Congress originally intended to restrain under Section
10(b).
In this Comment, I discuss the evolution and current application
of the misappropriation theory of insider trading and argue that it
simply strays too far from the fraud tenets of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.
A thorough understanding of the misappropriation theory is
possible only if one understands how it diverges from the classic theory
of insider trading. Therefore, in Section II, I discuss the evolution and
present doctrine of classic insider trading. The discussion in this
Section focuses on major cases in the development of this theory.
Section III presents the misappropriation theory of insider trading.
Section III focuses upon (1) the broad scope of the misappropriation
theory as initially adopted by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Carpenter,27 (2) the Circuit's later attempt to limit the scope of the
theory in United States v. Chestman,2' and (3) the effect that Chestman
has had on limiting the scope of the theory. Section III ultimately
shows that the misappropriation theory strays far from the fraud
prohibitions of Section 10(b) and has no identifiable limits, thereby
proscribing conduct that is not properly regulated by Section 1 0(b) and

23. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
24. Id. at 1029.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
1004 (1992).
26. See Christine Murra, Note, The MisappropriationTheory: A PracticalMeans of Imposing
Rule 10b-5 Liability, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 211, 221 (1990) [hereinafter The Misappropriation
Theory].
27. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
28. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
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Rule 10b-5. Finally, Section IV presents alternative ways to achieve
the valuable public policy of the misappropriation theory.29 Section
III concludes that new rules prohibiting the use of material, nonpublic
information for an improper purpose should be promulgated under the
authority granted to the SEC by Section 10(b).
II. CLASSIC INSIDER TRADING
The regulation of insider trading is based on the assumption that
the use of material, nonpublic information in a securities transaction
undermines investor expectations of fairness and equal opportunity in
Individuals who are privy to material,31
the securities markets.3
nonpublic32 information should not be allowed to profit from knowledge of this information unless the knowledge is gained through
investigation and skill, not through a position of trust and confidence.33
A person working for a corporation or an investment house has
access to material, nonpublic information based on her position inside
the confidential sphere of the entity. With that position comes the
corresponding duty to refrain from using the information for personal
gain. Use of confidential information within the securities market
without disclosure to the rest of the market violates the duty owed to
shareholders and is fraud prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
This is what is meant by the term "insider trading." The scope of the
classic theory of insider trading is set out below.
A. In re Cady, Roberts, Inc.
The first major development in the application of Section 10(b) to
insider trading activities occurred in the 1961 SEC hearing In re Cady,
29. The misappropriation theory serves the public interest by expanding the scope of Rule
10b-5 to include more conduct that results from a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty. See infra
Section III.
30. Richard M. Phillips & Robert J. Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for
Legislative Repair, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65 (1984); see Chestman, 947 F.2d at 565.
31. Information is material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor]
would consider it important in [deciding whether to buy, sell, or to hold the company's securities,
or if it would have] significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available [to the
shareholder]." John I. McMahon, Jr., Note, A Statutory Definition of Insider Trading: The Need
to Codify the Misappropriation Theory, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 985, 986 n.6 (1988) (citing TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
32. Nonpublic information is information that "has not been disseminated in a manner
making it available to investors generally." In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 643
(1971).
33. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19
(1987).
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Roberts, Inc. 4 This case involved a registered broker-dealer who,
while in possession of information concerning a planned dividend cut
by a company, directed his clients to liquidate their holdings in that
company.35 The broker acquired this information from a corporate
insider who owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation.36 The SEC determined that the broker's actions "violated [Rule
10b-5(3)] as a practice which operated .. .as a fraud or deceit upon
the purchasers."37 The SEC reasoned that because a corporate insider
owes a fiduciary duty to both the shareholders and the corporation
itself, using confidential information for personal benefit constitutes
fraud. This reasoning has been termed the "disclose or abstain"
rule.3 8
Two factors led the SEC to adopt the disclose or abstain rule.
First, the relationship between an insider and the source of the
information is such that access to, and use of, the information is only
for corporate purposes and not for the insider's personal benefit.39
Second, it is inherently unfair for the insider to take advantage of
others in the market who are trading without the benefit of the
nonpublic information.40 The disclose or abstain rule mandates that
the possessor of material, nonpublic information obtained through a
fiduciary relationship must either disclose the information prior to a
securities transaction or abstain from trading in the company's
securities."
B.

Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.

The disclose or abstain rule advanced in Cady, Roberts was
expanded in 1968 by the Second Circuit's decision in SEC v. Texas

34. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
35. Id. at 913.
36. Id. at 913. An explanation of how a breach of a fiduciary duty by a corporate insider
leads to a transferred duty to the broker-dealer is discussed infra Section II.D.
37. Id. The broker-dealer was a "tippee" of the corporate insider. See infra Section lI.D.
38. E.g., William A. Snider, Note, Securities Law--All in the Family--United States v.
Chestman: Finding a Fiduciaryor OtherSimilar Reactionof Trust and Confidence Under Rule lOb5 for Family Members of a Family Controlled Publicly Traded Corporation, 16 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 79, 84 (1994); David Cowan Bayne, The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: 'Disclose or Abstain'?,
42 KAN. L. REV. 75, 76 (1993); Alison Grey Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries,and Insider Trading,
10 HOrSTRA L. REV. 341, 342 n.3 (1982).
39. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 913.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 912. An explanation of how the seller of a security owes a fiduciary duty to the
purchaser of a security as a shareholder, prior to purchase, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For an excellent explanation of this theory, see Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
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395

Gulf Sulphur Co.42 In this case, several officers and directors of
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company purchased shares in the corporation's
stock based on confidential information relating to an upcoming mine
strike. 43 The corporate insider defendants also disclosed this information to a number of persons who were not privy to the confidential
information."
The court held that the disclose or abstain rule
espoused by the SEC was a valid method of attacking insider trading,
but found that the scope of the rule should be broader than advocated
in Cady, Roberts.45 The court defined the disclose or abstain rule as
requiring anyone in possession of material, non-public information to
either disclose the information prior to trading or abstain from trading
in the corporation's securities. 46 This broader interpretation ensured
that all investors had equal access to information.4 7 The court
believed that the purpose of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to ensure
equal access to information by all market participants. In contrast, the
SEC believes that the purpose of the enactments is to prohibit insiders
from breaching the fiduciary duty owed to corporations and their
shareholders.48 The rule in Texas Gulf Sulphur thus regulated insider
trading based on the nature of the information possessed by a securities
trader and not on how the person obtained the information.
Texas Gulf Sulphur introduced significant confusion into the
regulation of insider trading. Primarily, a violation of Section 10(b)
based on the nature of the information possessed rather than on how
the information was obtained greatly expanded the scope of insider
trading. Under the broader interpretation of Section 10(b), the use of
material, nonpublic information in the securities market is fraudulent
in and of itself; there is no requirement that the inside trader first agree
to not use the information for personal gain. Additionally, because the
SEC was not bound to follow the Second Circuit's decision, a

42. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
43. Id. at 839-42.
44. Id. at 844.
45. Id. at 848.
46. Id. The court's definition of the theory read that:
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the
investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate
confidence, or chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the
securities concerned while such inside information remains disclosed.
Id.
47. Id.
48. See generally Suzanne Krudys, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory:
Boundaries Limitless? 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 317 (1991).

Are the
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dichotomy resulted in the regulation of insider trading.49 The SEC
applied the more stringent disclose or abstain rule, while the Second
Circuit applied the broader disclose or abstain rule, which simply
required the possession of material, nonpublic information. The
conflict between these two interpretations of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 eventually led to the Supreme Court's involvement in this area.
C.

Chiarellav. United States

The Supreme Court set out to resolve the discrepancy between the
Second Circuit's and SEC's interpretations of the disclose or abstain
rule in Chiarella v. United States. ° Chiarella was an employee of a
financial printer."' Among the documents that he handled in that
position were five announcements of corporate takeover bids.
Although the documents did not include the specific targets, Chiarella
was able to ascertain which companies were being targeted. He then
used this information to purchase stock in the targeted companies.5 2
He sold the stock immediately after the takeover bids were announced,
reaping a $30,000 profit in a fourteen month span.53
In January 1978, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of
violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.14 He was subsequently
convicted on all counts and appealed his conviction. 5 A divided
The majority
Second Circuit affirmed Chiarella's conviction. 6
followed the reasoning set out in Texas Gulf Sulphur and ruled that
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were based on "parity of information,"
not on violation of a fiduciary duty, as held in Cady, Roberts. Thus,
the court ruled that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who
regularly receives material non-public information may not use that
information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty
to disclose.""
The Supreme Court reversed, explicitly rejecting the "parity of
information" rule advanced by the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf

49. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, SEC Nonacquiescence in Judicial Decisionmaking: Target
Company Disclosure of Acquisition Negotiations, 46 MD. L. REv. 1001 (1987).
50. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
51. A financial printer prints documents relating to financial transactions, for example,
prospectus or proxy.
52. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 224.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 225.
55. Id.
56. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
57. Id. at 1365.
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Sulphur and adopting the breach of fiduciary duty approach advocated
by the SEC in Cady, Roberts."8
The Court presented a very simple two-part rationale for adopting
the breach of fiduciary duty approach. First, the use of material,
nonpublic information in the securities market for personal gain is
fraudulent because a corporate insider owes a fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders. One aspect of a corporate insider's
fiduciary duty to the corporation is the requirement that the insider
place the shareholder's interest before her own. 9 Thus, if a corporate
insider trades in the corporation's securities without disclosing that she
is trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information obtained as
a result of her status as a corporate insider, her fiduciary duty to the
shareholder is breached.6"
Second, the Court discussed why the Second Circuit's "parity of
information" rule did not apply to insider trading cases. Silence is only
fraudulent when a party has a duty to disclose. If no duty to disclose
exists, there is no fraud.6" In this case, Chiarella was not an insider
of either corporation involved in the takeover transactions. Thus, he
did not owe a duty to the target corporation or to the shareholders of
the corporation.62 In the absence of a duty to a corporation or its
shareholders, Chiarella was not required to disclose his superior
He therefore
knowledge prior to conducting the transactions.
63
summed
up this
act.
The
Court
best
committed no fraudulent
described as a
argument when it said that while Section 10(b) is aptly
64
catchall provision, "what it catches must be fraud.
The Chiarella decision is the foundation of classic insider trading.
It recognizes that one cannot be an inside trader unless two criteria are
present: (1) information is obtained as a result of a fiduciary relationship between the insider and the corporation whose securities are
involved, and (2) the insider trades in those securities without
disclosing her superior knowledge.

58. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232-35.
59. Id. at 230.
60. Id. at 228. At common law, one who is under a duty to disclose information prior to
the consummation of a transaction commits fraud if the information is not disclosed. Id. at 22728. Similarly, to remain silent when one has a duty to disclose material, nonpublic information
is fraudulent, and therefore violative of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S. Id. at 230.
61. Id. at 232.
62. Id.
63. Id. It is important to note that after the Court's ruling in Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646
(1983), Mr. Chiarella would have been guilty of violating Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 because
of his status as a temporary insider. See infra Section II.D.
64. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
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Chiarella is also important for a second reason: In Chief Justice
Burger's dissenting opinion, the seed for the misappropriation theory
of insider trading was planted.6" Chief Justice Burger accepted an
argument advanced by the United States that Chiarella owed a
fiduciary duty to his employer, the printing company. Because he
obtained material, nonpublic information as a result of his position,
Chiarella breached the duty owed to his employer and his employer's
customers by not disclosing his superior knowledge prior to using it for
personal gain.66 The majority did not address this issue because it
felt it was not reviewable.67 Vhile the misappropriation theory of
insider trading was not successful as a basis for liability in Chiarella,
it was certainly noticed.68
D. Dirks v. SEC
Although the role of classic insider trading was clarified in
Chiarella, the Supreme Court subsequently reviewed and expanded its
scope in Dirks v. SEC.69 Dirks was a securities analyst who specialized in insurance company securities for institutional investors. In
March 1973, Dirks was contacted by a former officer of Equity
Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life
insurance and mutual funds. Dirks was advised that Equity Funding
had drastically overstated its assets and that fraud was rife within the
corporation. Dirks thereafter conducted his own investigation, verified
the fraud within Equity Funding, and advised all of his clients of his
findings. 7° He was subsequently indicted and convicted of aiding and
abetting those who sold their stock based on material, non public
information." The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed
Dirks' conviction 72 and he appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed. 73 The Court found that Dirks did
not owe a duty to the shareholders of Equity Funding in his capacity
as a "tippee" of the corporate insider; therefore, he had no duty to

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 235, 236.
Id. The jury was not instructed on this potential theory of liability.
See infra Section III.
463 U.S. 646 (1983). This is one of the few decisions in this area that did not originate

within the Second Circuit.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 650.
72. S.E.C. v. Dirks, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
73. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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disclose his superior information to shareholders prior to acting on
it.74 In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted a three part test
to determine if a corporate insider's tippee assumes the tipper's duty
to the corporation and its shareholders. First, an insider must breach
the fiduciary duty owed to the corporation by disclosing material,
nonpublic information.S Second, the tippee must know, or reasonably should know, that the insider breached this duty.76 And third,
the tippee must trade on the information that was improperly
received."
The Dirks Court's analysis ended with the first factor of the three
step test. The Court stated that in order for an insider to breach her
duty to the shareholder by revealing material, nonpublic information
she must personally benefit (directly or indirectly) from the disclosure.78 Because the corporate insider in the Dirks case merely desired
to expose the fraud incumbent within Equity Funding and not to
benefit personally, the Court found that Dirks did not breach any duty
owed to the shareholders.79 Therefore, Dirks could not have inherited
a fiduciary duty to the shareholders."0
Although Dirks was held not to have violated insider trading
rules, the Court set out a test that brings many more people within the
reach of insider trading laws. The Dirks Court went further than
merely stating that a tippee may inherit the fiduciary duty of an
insider. The Court stated that "temporary" insiders, persons who
work for a company that has access to a corporation's material,
nonpublic information, may be treated as insiders to the extent that
they are privy to nonpublic information." Temporary insider status
is only effective if the corporation expects the outsider to keep
nonpublic information confidential and the relationship between the
parties implies a duty to do so.8 2 Thus, underwriters, lawyers,
analysts, reporters, financial printers, or consultants for corporate
clients who become privy to nonpublic information, are considered
"temporary insiders" and are subject to insider trading liability.
74. Id. at 667. A "tippee" is a person who is given non-public information from a corporate

insider when no one else is given that information. Krudys, supra note 48, at 323.
75. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
76. Id.
77. Id.

78. Id. at 662. Examples of benefits from disclosure include pecuniary gain, any quid pro
quo, or reputational benefit that may or may not turn into future earnings. Id. at 663.
79. Id. at 665.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 655 n.14.
82. Id.
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Individuals to whom temporary insiders convey material, nonpublic
information, as tippees, are also subject to insider trading liability.8"
Although the Dirks decision greatly expanded the number of
persons within the scope of insider trading laws, it allowed for at least
two situations in which insiders' disclosure of material, nonpublic
information would not lead to a violation of insider trading laws. First,
an insider may give information to an analyst who is an active trader
in the securities of the insider's corporation. 4 This is a common
practice beneficial to the corporation because it allows analysts to more
accurately value the corporation's securities.8 " The insider conveying
the information does not receive personal benefit from such a
disclosure; thus, the analyst receiving the information is free to trade
in the securities of the involved corporation without disclosing his
superior information.
Second, an individual with no ties to a corporate insider who
happens to overhear a discussion that involves material, nonpublic
information has no duty to disclose the information she overhears prior
to trading in the corporation's securities.8 6 This scenario fails the
second prong of the three part requirement for tippee liability set out
in Dirks. The tipper had no relationship with the corporate insider;
consequently, it would be impossible for the tippee to know that the
insider was violating a duty that she owed to her corporation.
Therefore, the tippee does not violate Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 by
trading in the securities of the involved corporation without first
disclosing her superior information.
The foregoing analysis constitutes the current structure of the
classic insider trading theory. There is no liability unless a corporate
or temporary insider breaches a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation
or its shareholders. If the insider breaches a duty by relaying material,
nonpublic information, liability will not attach to the tippee unless the
tippee was aware that the insider both breached a duty and received a
benefit from the breach. Thus, in the absence of an insider benefiting

83. Id.; See Strauss & Fishbone, supranote 6, at '3. It is interesting to note that under this
doctrine Mr. Chiarella would be guilty of insider trading on the facts of that case because, as an
employee of a financial printer, he was privy to nonpublic information that was intended to
remain confidential. Thus, Mr. Chiarella was a temporary insider of the company that hired the
printer to do the work.
84. Phillips & Zutz, supra note 30, at 83.
85. Id.
86. James B. Stewart, Hot Tips Can Mean Trouble with SEC if You Aren't Careful, WALL
ST. J., July 21, 1989, at A6. This is also a loophole in the Dirks holding, but is less of a concern
because this type of insider trading is probably much less common than the everyday occurrences
in the analyst setting.
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from disclosure, there cannot be liability under the classic form of
insider trading. It remains a possibility, however, to incur liability
under the misappropriation theory of insider trading.

III.

MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY

In this Section, I discuss the evolution and current status of the
misappropriation theory. I also discuss the probable future of the
misappropriation theory and the policy considerations affecting the
future expansion or contraction of the theory. The discussion will
focus on the major cases in the development of the misappropriation
theory.
The misappropriation theory of insider trading greatly expands the
scope of events that fall within the ambit of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. The misappropriation theory is based upon a very broad
reading of Rule 10b-5.S7 Under the misappropriation theory, a party
is liable for insider trading if she breaches any duty owed to any party
by using material, nonpublic information for personal gain. Under this
theory, it is not required that an insider breach a duty owed to the
corporation or the shareholders of the corporation whose security is
sold in order for liability to attach."8
The misappropriation theory is still a young and evolving
doctrine. The first mention of the theory did not appear until Chief
9
Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Chiarella."
However, the
misappropriation theory was not applied as the sole grounds of liability
until the 1986 case of United States v. Carpenter.90 The Carpenter
decision gives a limitless interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob5, making it possible for any person trading in securities, even a person
who purchases only one security in their entire life, to be subject to
liability under the misappropriation theory.9 The Second Circuit,
realizing Carpenter's broad sweep, attempted to limit the scope of the
theory in United States v. Chestman.92 However, the attempt appears
to have been unsuccessful because lower courts are not following
Chestman's narrow holding.93 This leaves the scope and future of the

87. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029-30
(2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
88. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1030.
89. See 445 U.S. 222, 239 (1980).
90. See 791 F.2d 1024 (1986).
91. See id. at 1032-34.
92. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
93. See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (acknowledging that
the Supreme Court has recognized the misappropriation theory but has not yet approved of it by
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misappropriation theory up in the air. Moreover, although the theory
has never been rejected by any court that has considered it,94 and it
has been adopted within six federal circuits, 9 it has never been
explicitly accepted by the Supreme Court. 96
A.

Newman and Materia

The first two cases to apply the misappropriation theory of insider
trading to the acts of securities traders were United States v. Newman97 and SEC v. Materia,98 both of which were decided in the
Second Circuit. Although these two cases were the first to apply the
misappropriation theory, they are not often cited as part of the
evolution of the misappropriation theory because they are now
considered to fall within the classic theory of insider trading as
expanded by the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks.
In Newman, two of the defendants were employees of different
investment banking firms. These two defendants were privy to
material, nonpublic information about many corporations because of
their roles as advisors for the corporations." 9 They advised Newman,
a securities broker, of material, nonpublic information about the
corporations. Newman subsequently used the information to trade in
the stock of the corporations. When the information became public
and impacted the price of the stock, Newman sold the stock for a large
profit. 100 The district court dismissed the complaint against Newman, but the Second Circuit reversed. 10' The Newman court explicitly adopted the misappropriation theory for the first time. 0 2 The
court held that the two insider defendants violated the duty that they
0 3
owed to their employer corporations to maintain confidentiality.
This in turn caused the employer to breach the duty it owed to the

a majority of the Court); see also infra Section III.D.
94. Hazen, supra note 11, at 599.
95. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992); SEC
v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg
v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1981); United States v. ReBrook, 837 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.W.V. 1993), motion for new trial denied,
842 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.W.V. 1994).
96. See Hazen, supra note 12, at 598.
97. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1982).
98. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
99. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15.
100. Id. at 15-16.
101. Id. at 20.
102. Id. at 17.
103. Id.
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corporations whose securities were traded, resulting in a violation of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."°
Materia, the second case to apply the misappropriation theory, is
factually similar to Chiarella. In Materia, the defendant was a copy
reader for a firm that specialized in printing financial documents.
Materia acquired confidential information about proposed tender offers
from the documents that he read for his employer and used the
information to personally trade in the stocks of the affected companies.'
The Second Circuit upheld the trial court's determination
that Materia had breached a duty of confidentiality to his employer,
06
which resulted in a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1
While these two cases were the first to rely on the misappropriation theory of insider trading, they have since been swallowed by the
wider net of the classic theory of insider trading. Subsequent to
Newman, and the trial court's decision in Materia, the Supreme Court
decided Dirks, in which classic insider trading was extended to those
Thus, factually similar cases to
who are "temporary insiders."
Newman and Materia will now be decided under the Dirks' classic
theory of insider trading rather than the misappropriation theory.'0 7
After Dirks, it appeared that the misappropriation theory was short
lived. That changed in 1986.
B.

Carpenter

The misappropriation theory resurfaced as a viable, independent
0°
theory of insider trading liability in United States v. Carpenter.'
The Second Circuit's decision in Carpenter indicates how wide a net
the misappropriation theory casts over insider trading. Defendant
Winans was a Wall Street Journal (Journal)reporter who wrote the
"Heard on the Street" ("Heard") column for the paper. Winans
passed on information about upcoming columns to Carpenter, a news
° Carpenter then relayed the information about
clerk at the Journal.'O
the upcoming articles to Winans' broker friends, defendants Felis and
Felis and Brandt began trading in the securities of
Brandt." 0
corporations that were the subject of upcoming "Heard" columns."1

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.at 16.
Materia, 745 F.2d at 199.
Id. at 199-201.
See Strauss & Fishbone, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
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By using the information prior to dissemination to the public through
the Journal, the group reaped a profit exceeding $690,000.112 Their
activities were eventually discovered by the SEC and Winans,
Carpenter, and Felis were charged with violations of Section 10(b) and
the misappropriation theory,
Rule 10b-5.113 The trial court, applying
114
found all of the defendants guilty.
On appeal, the court began its analysis by noting that this case
did not fall directly within the ambit of Newman or Materia because
the defendants were not insiders, temporary or otherwise, of the
corporations whose stock they traded.115 The court also noted that
both Carpenter and Winans were aware that the Journal had a policy
that nonpublic information acquired on the job was to be held
confidential.11 6 Thus, Carpenter and Winans owed a fiduciary duty
of confidentiality to the Journal.117
The court next addressed the defendants' argument that the
misappropriation theory should not apply in their case. The defendants argued that a breach of their duty of confidentiality to the
Journal was not sufficient to hold them liable under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. Rather, based on Newman and Materia, they must owe
and breach a duty to the corporation, or to the shareholders of the
corporation, whose stocks they purchased or sold based on the
confidential information learned at the Journal.11
In rejecting this argument, the court began by analyzing Newman
and Materia. The court interpreted these cases to hold that the
misappropriation theory proscribes the conversion by "'insiders' or
others of material, non-public information in connection with the
'
The court interpreted Newman to
purchase or sale of securities."119
stand for the proposition that "trading on the basis of improperly
obtained information is fundamentally unfair and that distinctions
premised on the source of the information undermine the prophylactic

112. Id.
113. Carpenter,791 F.2d at 1025. Brandt became the government's key witness in the case.
Id. at 1026.
114. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (1986).
115. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028-29.
116. Id. at 1026.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1029.
119. Id. (citing Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985)).
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intent of the securities laws."' 20 Moreover, the court noted that the
Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that securities laws
combating fraud should be construed not technically and restrictively,
but "flexibly."''
Finally, the court looked to the policies and
purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Focusing on Rule 10b-5,
the Carpenter court observed that it "prohibits 'any person ... [from
employing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud."""2 The Rule
also prohibits "any act, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any person."' 23 Finally, the court noted
that Section 10(b) of the Act, as implemented by Rule 10b-5, was
designed as a catchall clause to prevent all fraudulent practices.'24
Under this interpretation, the court found that the misappropriation
theory was applicable to the facts of the case.
The court then proceeded to analyze each element of Rule 10b5(c)'25 under the misappropriation theory. The court began by
considering whether the defendants' actions operated as fraud or deceit.
Carpenter and Winans owed a fiduciary duty of confidentiality to the
Journal. They committed fraud and deceit by misappropriating
confidential information for their own benefit and failing to disclose
their superior information prior to investing in the securities.' 26 As
a result of their actions, the defendants violated Section 10(b), which
proscribes fraudulent trading by both insiders and outsiders.'27
The court next proceeded to the "upon any person" requirement
of Rule 10b-5(c). The fraud in Carpenter was committed upon
Carpenter's and Winans' employer, the Journal.2 '
The court
decided that the parties, through their complicity, "perpetrated their

120. Carpenter,791 F.2d at 1029 (quoting SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)).
121. Id. (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
122. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1030.
123. Id. at 1029-30 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (emphasis added by Court of Appeals)).
124. Id. at 1030 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980)).
125. See supra note 9.
126. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031. The abstain or disclose theory still applies in this area
because it is a corollary to the fiduciary duty that defendants owe to the source of the material
nonpublic information.
127. See supra note 8. A similar conclusion would result if Carpenter and Winans had
stolen material, nonpublic information as traditional corporate insiders or quasi-insiders. The
liability of the brokers, Felis and Brandt, stemmed from their status as tippees of Carpenter and
Winans. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031-32.
128. Id.
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fraud 'upon' the Journal, sullying its reputation and thereby defrauding
1 29
it 'as surely as if they took [its] money."
The court then proceeded to the "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security" requirement of Rule 10b-5(c). The use of
misappropriated information for the benefit of the defendants, and to
the detriment of those with whom they traded, supported the
conclusion that the defendants' fraud was in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. 130 The court found that the protection
of fairness and integrity in the securities markets was the major
purpose of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.13 Further, investors are
equally harmed by the fraud of both non-insiders and insiders. 32
Finally, the court found that there was a nexus between the fraud
in Carpenter and the federal regulatory scheme. 133 The court reasoned first that the information the defendants misappropriated had
absolutely no value to them except "in connection with their subsequent purchases and sales of securities.' 34 Second, the court held
with" portion of Rule 10b-5(c) should be
that the "in connection
13
interpreted broadly.
Having determined that all of the requirements of Rule 10b-5(c)
were present, the court addressed the defendants' final argument. The
defendants argued that it was anomalous to hold them liable for using
material, nonpublic information for their benefit in the securities
market when their employer could lawfully perform the same acts
without liability.136 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that
it was unrealistic to expect the Journal to risk its continuing vitality by
undertaking such actions."3 7 Further, the relevant question was not
what acts the Journal could lawfully perform, but rather what actions
exposed the defendants to liability. 3 ' The defendants had a duty to
keep information learned in their capacity as employees confiden-

129. Id. (quoting Neunnan, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981)).
130. Id. at1032.
131. Id. at 1030.
132. Id. at1032.
133. Id. at 1031.
134. Id. at 1033.
135. Id. at 1032; Competitive Assocs., Inc. v.Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
516 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975)).
136. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1033.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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tial. 3 9 Disclosure of that information violated their fiduciary duty
to the Journal.140
Thus, the Carpentercourt held that when individuals misappropriate material, nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty or
similar relationship of trust and confidence, and use that information
in a securities transaction, they violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-S
unless they disclose their superior information to those with whom
they trade. 4 ' Because the defendants did not disclose their superior
information to the other parties to the transaction, they committed
fraud in violation of Section 10(b) as promulgated through Rule 10b42
5(c).'
The Carpenter decision is important for two reasons. First, it is
the foundation upon which all future misappropriation cases are based.
Carpenter is vital to the evolution of the misappropriation theory not
only because it revived the theory after it had been subsumed by the
Dirks decision, but also because the court explicitly described why the
misappropriation theory was a valid interpretation of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.143 Second, the misappropriation theory is virtually
unlimited in scope of application. The Carpenter court's very literal,
broad reading of Rule 10b-5 suggests that virtually anyone trading in
securities may fall within Section 10(b). Merely requiring a breach of
any fiduciary duty or a similar relationship of "trust and confidence,"
and subsequent use of information gained from the breach in the
securities market, exponentially increases the number of people who
may be affected by these laws. Thus, the Second Circuit, in attempting to broaden the reach of the insider trading laws, created what may
be a Pandora's box by not restricting the scope of the misappropriation
theory. There is simply no way to know what kind of behavior this
rule will encompass because the number and types of fiduciary and
fiduciary-like duties are innumerable. The court attempted to remedy

139. Id.
140. Id. at 1034.
141. Id. at 1028-29; see In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
142. Carpenter,791 F.2d at 1034. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' request for
certiorari. The Court, however, was evenly divided about whether the defendants had violated
Section 10(b) under the misappropriation theory applied by the Second Circuit. Thus, the Court
affirmed the convictions, leaving its stamp of approval or rejection of the misappropriation theory
for another day. United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987); see The Misappropriation
Theory, supra note 24, at 221. The Court's affirmation of the lower court's decision carries no
precedential value because of an evenly divided court. See Salbu, supra note 12, at 232 n.61.
143. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1029.
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this problem in its next major misappropriation theory case, United
States v. Chestman."'
C.

United States v. Chestman

In 1990, the Second Circuit was faced with the ramifications of its
sweeping decision in Carpenter. After a three judge panel of the court
reversed defendant Chestman's conviction for insider trading violations
based on the misappropriation theory, the court agreed to rehear the
case en banc.14 The complexity in United States v. Chestman was the
unusual nature of the facts that gave rise to the defendant's conviction.
Robert Chestman was a broker and financial advisor for Keith
Loeb.'4 6 Loeb's wife Susan was the niece of the president and
controlling shareholder of Wauldbaum, Inc., a fact of which Chestman
was aware. 147 In 1986, Wauldbaum entered negotiations to sell
Wauldbaum, Inc. to Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc.
(A&P).' 41 Upon reaching an agreement to transfer control of Wauldbaum, Inc. to A&P, Wauldbaum advised his sister, Shirley Witkin,
that he would tender her Wauldbaum, Inc. shares to A&P along with
his own.149 Wauldbaum also advised his sister to keep the transfer
information confidential and not to discuss it with anyone. °
Three days after she tendered her shares to her brother, Ms.
Witkin told her daughter, Wauldbaum's niece, that she had just
returned from tendering her shares in Wauldbaum, Inc. to her brother
and that the company was in the process of being sold."5 ' Ms.
Witkin also admonished Susan Loeb not to tell anyone except her
husband, Keith, about the deal because the deal was beneficial for the
company and if word got out the deal could be ruined.'
The next
day, Ms. Loeb told her husband about the impending deal involving
Wauldbaum, Inc., and advised him not to tell anyone.'53
The following day, Loeb phoned Chestman and advised him that
he "had some definite, some accurate information" that Wauldbaum,
Inc. was in the process of being sold." 4 Chestman stated that he

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
Id.at 554.
Id. at 555.
id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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could not advise Loeb how to proceed because the information that
Loeb possessed was nonpublic." 5 However, several minutes later
Chestman purchased 3,000 shares of Wauldbaum, Inc. stock for his
own account.' 5 6 Later that morning, he purchased over 8,000 shares
of Wauldbaum, Inc. stock for his discretionary accounts.'5 7 Finally,
just before the market closed for the day, Loeb phoned back and again
asked Chestman for his advice. Chestman would only say that based
on his research, Wauldbaum, Inc. was a "buy."' 5 8 Loeb thus placed
an order for 1,000 shares of Wauldbaum, Inc. stock. 5 9 The sale of
Wauldbaum, Inc. was announced after the market closed for the day
and the value of Wauldbaum, Inc.'s shares increased by over thirty
percent the next day. 6 °
The nonpublic information that Chestman possessed prior to the
announcement of the sale of Wauldbaum, Inc. was eventually
discovered.
Loeb agreed to testify for the government against
Chestman.1 6' Chestman was tried as the tippee of Loeb. Under the
misappropriation theory, it was Loeb who must have violated a duty
of confidentiality that he owed to either his wife or the Wauldbaum
family.162 If the government was unable to show that Loeb violated
a fiduciary duty, then Chestman could not be held liable as his tippee.
The jury, however, found that Loeb violated the fiduciary duty that he
owed to both his wife and the Wauldbaum family. 63 Chestman was
found guilty of ten violations of Rule 10b- 5 because he was a tippee of
Loeb.' 64 Chestman appealed his conviction to the Second Circuit,
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.
The three judge panel reversed Chestman's conviction on all

155. Id. This indicates that Mr. Chestman at least had a suspicion that Mr. Loeb was in
possession of material, nonpublic inside information.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 555-56.
162. Id. at 564. Mr. Loeb was the person who had to have violated a fiduciary duty because
he was dealing with Mr. Chestman in an arms length manner, thus Mr. Chestman owed no duty
to Mr. Loeb. However, if Mr. Loeb violated a duty of confidentiality and Mr. Chestman was
aware of the breach, he would be a tippee of Mr. Loeb. See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); supra
Section II.D.
163. United States v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd, 903 F.2d 75 (2nd
Cir. 1990), vacated, 947 F.2d 551 (2nd Cir. 1991) (en banc).
164. Id. Mr. Chestman was also found guilty of violating several other securities laws.
These violations are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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counts. 165 However, the full court agreed to re-hear the matter en
banc.
The en banc court was divided. By a six to five majority, the
court overturned Chestman's Rule 10b-5 convictions.166
The
majority emphasized the importance of its ruling in Carpenterbecause
it represented the first time that the traditional "fiduciary-shareholder"
relationship of the classic theory of insider trading had been abandoned
and the "fraud on the source" theory had been adopted.'67 As long
as the requisite fiduciary duty was tethered to the fiduciary-shareholder
context, as in classic insider trading, the scope of insider trading was
quite narrow. However, the presence of fiduciary duties in other areas,
as in Carpenter,was anything but clear, making the scope of the rule
unclear. The court stated its goal was to tread cautiously in extending
the misappropriation theory to relationships outside the employeremployee relationship for fear that the doctrine would take over "the
whole corporate universe. "168
The Chestman court began its analysis by considering which
relationships would satisfy the Carpenterrequirement that a "fiduciary
duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence" exist.'69 The
court first focused on what constituted a fiduciary duty. After stating
that the existence of family relationships or the act of placing trust in
another person does not automatically create a fiduciary duty, the court
compiled a non-exclusive list of common law fiduciary relationships.
These relationships include: Attorney-client, executor-heir, guardianward, principal-agent, trustee-trust beneficiary, and senior corporate
official-shareholder. 7 ' The court had no difficulty finding that the
relationships between Loeb and his wife and Loeb and the Wauldbaum family were not fiduciary relationships according to the court's
7
definition.' '

165. United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 947 F.2d 551 (2nd
Cir. 1991) (en banc).
166. Chestman, 947 at F.2d 554.
167. Id. at 567. Fraud on the source refers to owing a fiduciary duty to the source of the
material nonpublic information, which isnot the corporation whose securities are traded. For
example, in Carpenter,the defendants' acts were a fraud on the Wall Street Journal and they were
the source of the information, thus the term "fraud on the source." While classic insider trading
may also involve the use of information produced by the corporation for one's own benefit (a
fraud on the source), courts usually rely on the fiduciary duty owed directly to the shareholders
in finding fraud in classic insider trading situations. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567.
168. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567.
169. Id. The court was apparently concerned with restricting the limitless definition of the
misappropriation theory that it created in Carpenter.
170. Id. at 568.
171. Id.
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The court next considered whether there existed a "similar
relationship of trust and confidence" between either Loeb and his wife
or Loeb and the Wauldbaum family.'72 Because the essence of a
fiduciary relationship is the reposing of confidence and reliance in one
party and the exercise of de facto control and dominance by the other
party, 7 3 the court found that a "similar relationship of trust and
confidence" should be limited to relationships where one party is given
for the benefit of the other, subject
access to confidential information
174
to the other's discretion.
In applying this standard, the court found that Loeb had never
been trusted with confidential information within the Wauldbaum
family; he was never part of the family's "inner circle" or its business;
the information had been gratuitously provided to Loeb by his
wife. 175 Therefore, the court did not find a "similar relationship176 of
trust and confidence" between Loeb and the Wauldbaum family.
Finally, the court considered whether Loeb had a "similar
relationship of trust and confidence" with his wife. Reemphasizing
that familial relations alone are insufficient to satisfy this requirement,
the court noted that the only evidence of a relationship of trust and
confidence between the couple was that Mrs. Loeb advised her
husband to keep the Wauldbaum, Inc. information confidential and
that the two had shared confidences in the past. There was insufficient
evidence to hold that the information communicated between Mrs.
Loeb and her husband was to be kept secret based on an implied
The evidence did not indicate that Mrs.
fiduciary relationship.)
Loeb informed her husband of the information so that he could use it
in a form that would be of benefit to her. The evidence did not even
indicate that the two were in the habit of sharing business confidences
with one another. Thus, because Loeb did not expressly accept a duty
to keep the information confidential, and because there was no
indication of a fiduciary-like relationship between the spouses, Loeb
did not breach a "similar relationship of trust and confidence" as to his

172. Id.
173. Id.
461 U.S. 913
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.

(citing United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
(1983)).
at 568-69.
at 570-71.
at 571.
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wife. 7 Therefore, the court held that the conviction of Chestman
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should be reversed. 79
The five member dissent argued that the majority allowed form
to rule over substance.' ° They noted that the Wauldbaum family
consistently mixed family and business relationships; thus, Loeb had
sufficient access to inside information and should have been required
to abstain from trading in Wauldbaum, Inc. securities unless he
disclosed his superior information prior to trading.'' The dissent
also argued that the majority's failure to find a duty to maintain
confidentiality in situations where corporations are closely held within
a family will allow more confidential information about a small
corporation to get to the market than information about a large
publicly held corporation.8 2 In the dissent's view, Loeb breached a
fiduciary duty owed to his in-laws; therefore, Chestman could have
been considered a tippee of Loeb.'83
The majority's decision in Chestman indicates the court's desire to
retreat from the broad scope of the misappropriation theory adopted in
Carpenter. The court went to great pains to place a definable limit on
the type of fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty that, if breached, satisfies
the misappropriation theory. This attempt to limit the scope of the
theory, however, is not very effective. In attempting to bring the
theory into a more direct relationship with traditional securities
activities, the court relied on principles from agency, tort, and basic
common law, not securities law.' 84 This step only makes the scope
and desired purpose of the misappropriation theory more confusing.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are designed to prevent fraud "in
Courts have
connection with" the purchase or sale of securities.'
always given a very broad and expansive reading to the "in connection

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571 (Winter, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 579-81.
182. Id. at 580. The dissent set forth its own three part test to determine whether the
disclose or abstain rule should apply to a family member. This test would require a family to
disclose superior information or abstain from trading if: (i) she has received or expects (e.g.,
through inheritance) benefits from family control of a corporation, (ii) is in a position to learn
confidential corporate information through ordinary family interactions, and (iii) knows that under
the circumstances both the corporation and the family desire confidentiality. Under this test the
dissent found that Mr. Loeb had to abstain or disclose with regard to the information that he
conveyed to Mr. Chestman. Id.
183. Id. at 581.
184. See generally, Anderson, supra note 38.

185. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
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with" standard.' 86 This does not pose a problem within the classic
insider trading theory because the fraud connected with the traditional
shareholder-fiduciary relationship is closely tied to the securities
transaction.'8 7 However, in Carpenter, the court expanded the types
of relationships that could lead to a fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities,"' and made the field of insider trading
all the more confusing. Carpenterdeveloped misappropriation theory
into a mixed-type theory, in which a non-securities related relationship
could unknowingly lead to a violation of a securities related law.
The Chestman court realized the broad scope and confusion
created by the Carpenterdecision and therefore attempted to restrict its
effect by enforcing more traditional securities related problems.8 9
After Chestman, courts must analyze the status of a particular
relationship to determine if it is a traditional fiduciary relationship at
common law, in agency, or in tort in order to determine if the
relationship is traditionally one of trust and confidentiality. Only upon
an affirmative response to one of these inquiries is one able to
determine if the status of a particular relationship does or does not
violate the ever expanding misappropriation theory. Securities law is
thus becoming increasingly based on a nonsecurity analysis, reducing
the effectiveness of laws that attempt to target securities markets.
The Chestman decision leaves the role of the misappropriation
theory unclear. The seminal case in this area, Carpenter,turns on the
court's attempt to broaden the scope of the insider trading laws.
However, Chestman downplays the criteria that Carpenter utilized to
broaden the misappropriation theory, although it affirms its viability.
After Chestman, lower courts and all participants in the securities
market were in a position of great confusion. The lower courts quickly
began to interpret the Chestman and Carpenterdecisions.
D. The Willis Cases
The Second Circuit's attempt to restrict the misappropriation
theory was immediately tested in the Southern District of New York
case of United States v. Willis. 90 In this sub-section, I will focus on

186. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484
U.S. 19 (1987); Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516
F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975).
187. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1033.
188. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024.
189. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551.
190. 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Four court opinions resulted from the facts of this
case. The first opinion included only Mr. Willis as a defendant in a motion that the indictment
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the analysis of the United States v. Willis opinions. I will also discuss
the effect the Willis cases will have on the future of the misappropriation theory.
United States v. Willis, arguably, is a case that makes application
of the misappropriation theory through the use of Rule 10b-5 the most
difficult to comprehend. Willis was a psychiatrist who treated the wife
of a very prominent businessman, Sanford Weill. 9 ' During several
sessions with Mrs. Weill, Willis learned that Mr. Weill was deeply
involved in a potential transaction with a large bank and that the
transaction, if successful, would have a significant effect on the bank's
stock.' 92 Based on this information, Willis purchased over 13,000
shares of the bank's stock. After the information that he learned from
Mrs. Weill was made public, Willis sold the shares for a profit of over
$27,000.193 Willis was subsequently charged with violation of insider
trading laws based on his use of information that he misappropriated
from Mrs. Weill.'94 Willis initially pleaded guilty to the charges
against him, but in light of the Chestman decision, filed a motion for
withdrawal of his plea and moved to have all charges against him
dismissed. 9 ' The court granted Willis' request to withdraw his
guilty plea and then considered his motion that all charges be
dismissed.'
Willis advanced two arguments in support of his motion. First,
he argued that Mrs. Weill's status as the spouse of a corporate insider
was insufficient to create a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty upon Mrs.
Weill. 97 Second, Willis argued that according to Chestman, there
must be an unbroken chain of confidentiality from the insider, to the

against him be dismissed. United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) [hereinafter
Willis I]. The second opinion to result from this fact pattern involves only one of Mr. Willis'
co-defendants in a motion that the complaint against him be dismissed. SEC v. Willis, 777 F.
Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Willis II]. The third opinion resulting from this set of
facts is one resulting from another request by Mr. Willis that the indictment against him be
dismissed. United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Willis 111].
Finally, the same co-defendant that is the subject of Willis II is the subject of an opinion
concerning his motion to reargue his case in light of the Second Circuit's en banc decision in
Chestman. SEC v. Willis, 787 F. Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) [hereinafter Willis IV]. The primary
focus of this discussion is Willis III.
191. Willis I, 737 F. Supp. at 271. While Willis III is the case of greatest importance, the
court in Willis III referred to Willis I for the facts of the case. Accordingly, facts are taken from
Willis I and discussion of the court's ruling will focus on Willis III.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Willis III, 778 F. Supp. at 206.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 208 (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568).
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intermediary(s), to the person who ultimately used the information for
personal gain. 9 ' Under this logic, Willis argued, Mrs. Weill was
under no fiduciary duty to keep information acquired from her
husband confidential; thus, the information lost its confidentiality as
to anyone she informed.'99 Therefore, Willis did not misappropriate
the information from Mrs. Weill."' The court found no need to
assess Willis' first argument because it found that his second argument
had no merit.20'
The court found Willis' argument that an unbroken chain of
confidentiality is required to create a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty
misapplied the misappropriation theory.20 2 The important relationship is not the relationship between the insider and the confidant, but
rather the relationship between the misappropriator and the person
2 °3
from whom the information was misappropriated.
This rule is
based on the misappropriation theory's focus on any breach of a
fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty and the lack of a requirement that the
breach of a duty relate to a corporation or its shareholders."
For
example, in Chestman, it was the relationship between Loeb and his
wife that was critical, not his wife's relationship with her mother or her
uncle.205
The Second Circuit noted that the relationship between Willis and
Mrs. Weill was pertinent because Willis was the one who misappropriated the information for his own benefit.2" 6 The court found a
fiduciary relationship between the two based on Willis' oath of
confidentiality as to anything learned while treating patients.0 7
While the court conceded that this was not one of the traditional
relationships enumerated by the Chestman court, it held that the
concerns of the Chestman court were directed towards "amorphous
relationships of trust and confidence that are not inherently fiduciary
and recognized as such." 208 The Willis III court found that the
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 209.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. It is interesting to note the role that Chestman played in the case of one of Mr.
Willis' co-defendants in Willis II. The defendant in this action also sought to have his
indictments dismissed on the grounds of the Chestman decision. In denying this motion, the
judge gave Chestman a very small role in the evolution of the misappropriation theory. Thejudge
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doctor-patient relationship is an inherently and well recognized
fiduciary relationship.0 9 Therefore, the court found that Willis did
misappropriate the information that he learned from Mrs. Weill.
Willis had a corresponding duty to either disclose his superior
information prior to trading in the banks' securities or abstain from
trading in them.210 Because he did not disclose his superior information prior to using the information in the securities market, the court
denied Willis' motion requesting that all charges against him be
dropped."'
Willis III and IV indicate that lower courts do not view Chestman
as limiting the scope of the misappropriation theory, as the Chestman
court desired. Rather, lower courts view Chestman as an affirmation
Contrary to the Chestman court's
of the theory and nothing more.'
attempt, the Willis court used Chestman to broaden the misappropriation theory, expanding the types of fiduciary duties that satisfy this
theory. Chestman thus reaffirmed the Second Circuit's commitment to
the theory, allowing lower courts more comfort to reach non-traditional
securities violations.
The Willis decision further indicates how far the misappropriation
theory is removed from the securities market. In Willis, the harm
resulting from the breach of the fiduciary duty that Willis owed to
Mrs. Weill was that Mrs. Weill would have to either find a new
psychiatrist or spend more time in treatment with Willis in order to
resolve her stress caused by the incident. 2 4 The breach and the
resulting harm had no tie to the securities market at all. Although the
breach of Willis' fiduciary duty did have an effect on the securities
market, holding Willis liable strays far from the underlying tenet of
securities regulation-protecting investors' expectation of fairness and
equal opportunity in the market. 1 5 Willis' breach of the duty, and
the resulting harm to Mrs. Weill, had no effect on the fairness or equal

found that Chestman "fashioned no new rules of liability with respect to the misappropriation
theory. On the contrary, the Second Circuit simply found that there was insufficient evidence
to establish that a required element of the misappropriation claim had been satisfied-namely, that
there be a breach of a fiduciary relationship or other similar relationship of trust and confidence."
Willis IV, 787 F. Supp. 58, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Thus, similar to the Willis III court, this court
held that Chestman clarified, but did not restrict, the scope of the misappropriation theory. Id.
209. Willis III, 778 F. Supp. at 209.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id.; see also Strauss & Fishbone, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
213. See Strauss & Fishbone, supra note 6, at *12.
214. Willis, 737 F. Supp. at 274.
215. See Phillips & Zutz, supra note 30.
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opportunity of investors in the market. Willis thus falls within the
ambit of insider trading laws primarily because of the wide interpretation that the misappropriation theory gives to Section 10(b) and Rule
2 16
10b-5.
The Willis III and IV decisions are troubling for one other reason:
A determination that information is misappropriated based merely on
the presence of a fiduciary or fiduciary-type duty creates an inequity
within the law. Willis' misappropriation of the information from Mrs.
Weill resulted from the fiduciary duty he owed her, despite the fact
that Mrs. Weill did not owe a fiduciary duty to her insider husband.217 If Mrs. Weill were to leave Willis' office and tell her golf
partners the exact same information, and they later used the information to trade in the securities of the affected companies, they would not
have misappropriated information because they owed her no fiduciary
or fiduciary-like duty. An inequity is thus created.
The above scenario presents a problem because insider trading
laws will be applied based on the relationship between two parties and
not the status of the information possessed. The same information in
the hands of Willis and Mrs. Weill's golf partner(s) will have the same
effect on investors' expectations and fairness in the securities markets.
Therefore, one party should not be allowed to profit while the other
party is subject to liability.
The foregoing scenario exposes the root problem presented by
insider trading laws as broadly as does the misappropriation theory.
Although the misappropriation theory brings many transactions within
the scope of insider trading laws, it does so arbitrarily and inequitably.
It is not my contention that the use of material, nonpublic information
by either Willis or Mrs. Weill's golf partners should go unpunished;
rather, punishing the behavior under the rubric of committing a fraud
in relation to the sale or purchase of securities is not proper.
The breach of fiduciary duty requirement works well within the
classic insider trading theory.21 A breach of a duty does not occur
unless an insider gains a benefit,219 which only occurs if the information is used in the securities market.22 ° Thus, in classic insider
trading, transactions that undermine the central goals of securities

216. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19
(1987); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
217. Willis III, 778 F. Supp. at 208.
218. See supra Section IID.
219. See supra Section II.D.
220. See supra Section lI.D.
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regulation, expectations of fairness and equal opportunity, are
prohibited by the insider trading laws.
The same cannot be said about the misappropriation theory. The
use of material, nonpublic information in a securities transaction only
leads to a breach of a fiduciary duty if the person trading on the
information owes a fiduciary duty to the person from whom she
obtained the information, and the fiduciary does not disclose her
superior knowledge prior to using it to her benefit. However, whether
or not a fiduciary duty is breached by the transaction, investors'
expectations of fairness and equal opportunity are equally undermined
by the use of the material, nonpublic information in the securities
markets. Thus, focusing on the relationship between the misappropriator and the informer does not adequately protect the overall goals of
securities regulation-protecting investors' expectations of fairness and
equal opportunity.
In addition to exposing the root problem of the misappropriation
theory, the Willis cases illustrate why the Supreme Court needs to rule
on the viability and scope of this theory.22' A Supreme Court ruling
will give all courts a benchmark to follow in the development of the
theory. Until such time, lower courts are likely to contract and expand
the theory to fit the current climate of the courts and the general public
as well as the facts of the particular case. This leaves the courts and
defendants in a very precarious and unenviable position of uncertainty.
The Willis cases, relying on the Chestman court's reaffirmation of
the misappropriation theory, and working around the court's desire to
limit the scope of the theory, further indicates the viability and broad
scope of the theory. The information Willis learned from Mrs. Weill
was less confidential than the sale of Waldbaum, Inc., information to
which Loeb had access, yet Willis was held to have violated insider
trading laws. Chestman appears to be nothing but a fact specific
hazard in the road to expansion of the misappropriation theory.
Therefore, the Chestman court's fear that the theory will take over the
"whole corporate universe" remains a distinct possibility.2 22

221. The Court's only attempt to rule in the area ended in an evenly divided Court
confirming the lower court's ruling. See supra note 142.
222. United States v. Chestman, 947 U.S. 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1759 (1992) (citing United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1377 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1978)).
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EFFICACY OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE

The misappropriation theory is an attempt to achieve a commendable goal through the wrong vehicle. Few would argue that attempts
to eradicate the benefits enjoyed by those using material, nonpublic
information in the securities market is not a worthy goal.223 However, use of traditional insider trading laws is not the proper vehicle to
carry out this goal. This Section discusses why the misappropriation
theory should be implemented through a vehicle other than the
traditional insider trading laws.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were created by Congress and the
SEC to prevent the traditional corporate insider or quasi-insider from
using her position for personal gain, and from undermining investors'
expectations of fairness and equal opportunity in securities markets.224 The rules work well for this purpose in the classic insider
trading sphere. However, application of these rules to persons who do
not fall within the classic insider trading theory requires an incredibly
broad reading of the phrase "in connection with" and a contortion of
the requirement, found in Rule 10b-5, that "any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud" be employed.22
The attempt to stretch the
insider trading rules to cover nontraditional inside traders results in
inconsistent and unpredictable results. 26
To resolve the problems created by the misappropriation theory,
and to fill the holes within the classic and misappropriation theories of
insider trading, a new set of regulations should be adopted. Section
10(b) of the Act gives the SEC the authority to promulgate rules
relating to manipulative or deceptive devices or practices that are used
to purchase or sell any registered security.227 Consistent with this
authority, the SEC could adopt regulations that seek to achieve the
same ends as the misappropriation theory without having to fit
complaints within the framework of Rule 10b-5. In considering
potential frameworks, the Commission should assess how the framework will apply to problems incumbent in the misappropriation theory,
and to debt instruments to which the current regulatory structure does
223. But see HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 93-110
(1966).
224. See Salbu, supra note 12; Phillips & Zutz, supra note 30, at 65.
225. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
226. Compare Willis, 778 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1991), with Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
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not apply because there is no fiduciary duty owed to the owners.
Three broad frameworks could satisfy these objectives. First, a rule
could require an unbroken fiduciary chain from the misappropriator of
the material, nonpublic information down to the person who uses the
information in the securities markets. Second, regulations could be
based on the improper use of material, nonpublic information obtained
through a special relationship. Finally, regulations could be based on
the status and nature of the information possessed and not on the
presence or absence of a fiduciary duty. Each of these frameworks is
discussed below.
The first possible solution is a broad framework that follows the
argument of Willis that liability requires an unbroken fiduciary chain
leading from the insider to the misappropriator. This framework will
resolve the problems of inequity but will require careful drafting to
avoid requiring individuals to assess whether there has been a break in
the fiduciary chain. If regulations are not carefully drafted, a great deal
of analysis on the part of the misappropriator is required, leaving the
ultimate outcome largely in the hands of the court. Moreover, it does
not alleviate the problem faced by the Chestman court, namely,
defining the nature and scope of a fiduciary relationship or duty.
Therefore, this particular approach is not much of an improvement.
A second solution that may alleviate the problems created by the
misappropriation theory is one actually advocated in classic insider
trading theory.22 Under this approach, a person trading in securities
will violate Section 10(b) if she acquires material, nonpublic information through a special relationship and uses the information for an
improper purpose.2 9 An improper purpose is one not authorized or
expected by the person conveying the information.23
A special
relationship exists where the trader acquires information as a result of
a business, friendship, or other similar relationship. This concept is
easily understood by applying it to the facts of Willis. Willis had a
business relationship with Mrs. Weill and nonpublic material
information was conveyed to him in his capacity as her psychiatrist.
Proper use of this information by Willis would have been to analyze
her thoughts and feelings and to assist her to feel better. It was
improper for him to use the information in the securities market.
Because he was not told the information for his personal gain, its use
in the securities market was a violation of Section 10(b).

228. Phillips & Zutz, supra note 30.
229. See id. at 99.
230. Id.
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While the improper purpose proposal works well in the above
example, it is less clear how well it will work if Mrs. Weill gives the
information to her golf partner(s). The information could be viewed
as gossip and not intended to be acted upon, in which case its use in
the securities markets would be a violation of Section 10(b). The
scenario could also be viewed as information that was conveyed as the
result of a personal relationship between the two parties, in which case
its use is barred in the securities market altogether. Who decides what
is, and is not, a personal relationship? While these problems could be
resolved by drafting a new rule under Section 10(b), delineating such
special relationships will likely result in courts contracting and
expanding the Rule's terms, as is occurring with the current rule.
A final potential solution the SEC should consider is one that
focuses on the nature of the information possessed and not the status
of the person that uses the information in the securities market. This
structure removes the assessment of whether a fiduciary duty is present
and places a stringent requirement on people trading in the securities
market to determine if the information is material and nonpublic. This
approach is attractive because it could be drafted so that a party is
liable for trading with material, nonpublic information unless they can
show a good faith determination that the information was public.
Applying this approach to the golf partner example is easier than
trying to apply the other two approaches. Mrs. Weill's husband, as a
bank executive, is the classic insider. When he told his wife of the
impending bank transaction, he did not violate this proposed rule
because he did not gain any benefit.23' Under this proposal, Mrs.
Weill is not liable because she has not traded in the securities market
and receives no benefit from her golf partners' use of the information
in the securities markets. The golf partners, however, would be
required to ascertain the public nature of the information prior to
investing in the securities of the affected bank or be subject to liability
for insider trading. In this scenario, the golf partner(s) would not be
able to make a good faith showing that the information was public;
therefore, their actions constitute insider trading. This proposal
adheres more closely to the underlying tenets of securities regulation-investors' expectations of fairness and equal access; any person
trading in securities without a good faith belief in the public nature of
information violates this theory.
The foregoing suggestion, to regulate insider trading based on the
status of information possessed, parallels the framework struck down
231. See supra Section II.D.
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by the Supreme Court in Chiarella. My proposal can, however, be
reconciled with Chiarella. The ChiarellaCourt rejected the possession
of material, nonpublic information argument because if a person was
not an insider, quasi-insider, or tippee of an insider they did not owe
a fiduciary duty to the corporation whose securities were involved.
Because a breach of a fiduciary duty is required to find a violation of
Rule 10b-5, no violation could occur without such a fiduciary duty.
However, because I am advocating the adoption of a new rule
promulgated under Section 10(b), the Chiarella decision is not
implicated. The entire purpose of the promulgation of a new rule is
to get away from the fiduciary duty requirement. Cases requiring such
a duty are thus not directly binding on matters brought under the new
rule.
A second problem with the use of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
as vehicles for the regulation of insider trading is the inability of the
laws to regulate the trading of debt instruments by insiders. Debt
instruments involve a contractual relationship between a corporation
and holders of the instruments. It is impossible for an insider to
breach any fiduciary duty to a holder of a debt instrument because the
insider only owes the debt holder the duty of good faith and fair
dealing in carrying out the contract terms. Therefore, under the
current insider trading theories, it is not possible for an insider to be
held liable for using material, nonpublic information to invest in the
corporation's debt instruments.23 2 The debt instrument problem
indicates the need for an additional regulation, one not focusing on the
presence of a fiduciary duty, to enforce insider trading laws.
The current lack of a fiduciary duty in debt instrument trading
supports the promulgation of a rule that regulates insider trading based
upon the status of the information and not based upon the presence of
a fiduciary duty. Such a theory applies equally as well to debt
instruments as to equity instruments. Thus, it would. not matter what
type of instrument a person trades. The use of material, nonpublic
information in a securities transaction, without a good faith belief that
the information is public, or without first disclosing the information,
leads to a violation of Section 10(b).
The misappropriation theory, while attempting to achieve a very
worthy and much needed goal, is saddled with poor vehicles with

232. This problem indicates a second way in which the misappropriation theory is
inequitable in the manner in which it brings additional behavior within the scope of the insider
trading laws. Two identical fact patterns could have different results based on the status of the
involved security as an equity instrument or a debt instrument.
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which to carry out its purpose: Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Promulgation of new rules under the authority provided by Section
10(b) would allow the policy behind the misappropriation theory to live
on, while discarding the incompatible wagon to which it is hitched.
New rules that focus on an unbroken fiduciary chain, or ideally upon
the status of the information possessed, will greatly increase the equity
and predictability of the misappropriation theory. The promulgation
of new rules will bring nontraditional inside traders of debt and equity
instruments within the scope of insider trading laws.
V.

CONCLUSION

Insider trading is a very difficult area to regulate because of the
lack of statutory definition for insider trading. The SEC and federal
courts have been left to delineate what activities constitute insider
trading. Unfortunately, this type of scheme has largely led to
determinations on a case by case basis and to different interpretations
of the scope of insider trading by different regulatory bodies.
A consensus has been reached regarding some aspects of insider
trading. After the Supreme Court decided Dirks v. SEC,233 the scope
of classic insider trading was greatly solidified. Classic insider trading
focuses on the breach of a fiduciary-shareholder relationship as the
fraud required under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Dirks
decision also solidified which persons are considered insiders based on
their access, permanent or temporary, to material, nonpublic information. Thus, Dirks cleared up ambiguities regarding the scope of classic
insider trading theory. Unfortunately, it also marked the beginning of
the misappropriation theory of insider trading.
The misappropriation theory of insider trading abandons the
fiduciary-shareholder relationship and instead looks for fraud based on
the source of material, nonpublic information. This theory relies on
a very broad reading of all of the terms used in Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. The theory thus applies to persons who have no ties to
corporate insiders. Moreover, the theory has an unidentifiable scope
of application because of the inability to categorize all fiduciary and
fiduciary-like duties that may exist.
Thus, while the misappropriation theory is designed to achieve the
underlying purpose of securities regulation, namely, promotion of
investors' expectations of fairness and equal opportunity, it does so in
an inequitable manner. Inequity arises because the theory focuses on

233. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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the status of the communicator of the material, nonpublic information,
rather than on the status of the information communicated. This
inequity allows one party to use information for their benefit in a
securities transaction, while another party may not use the exact same
information unless they first disclose the superior information
possessed. Both situations equally implicate the underlying goals of
fairness and equal opportunity; it does not make sense that different
outcomes should result.
A new rule promulgated under Section 10(b), one that focuses on
the status of information used in a securities transaction, will alleviate
many of the problems currently existing in insider trading regulation.
This additional rule should focus on the status of the information used
in a securities transaction and not on the presence of a fiduciary or
fiduciary-like duty. This type of rule will adhere more closely to the
underlying tenets of securities regulation, and will cover investment in
debt instruments, an area not regulated under the current structure.
While promulgation of a new rule will initially add to the morass that
exists in the regulation of insider trading, the proposed rules are
straightforward, and an adoption of any one of them will quickly
alleviate many of the inequities that currently exist in the securities
markets.

